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The commercialisation and internationalisation of sporting activities alongside ongoing 
European integration has put the relationship between the European Union and the sports 
world under strain. The Bosman case marked the start of an intense debate on an appropriate 
regulatory framework for this evolving relationship. Whereas the Community judges in 
previous sport related cases had consistently opted for settling the dispute on the basis of free 
movement provisions, the Piau and the Meca-Medina & Majcen cases entail the first rulings 
on the application of EC competition law to sport. This paper tackles the difficulty of 
separating the economic aspects from the sporting aspects of a sport and the consequences of 
anti-trust law for sporting associations. Whether the Court of Justice provided satisfactory 
guidelines to deal with upcoming legal actions and more generally, whether these guidelines 
on the application of competition law might influence the governance of sport in Europe, is 
also considered.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
As a growing economic sector, sport cannot escape the application of European Community 
law. Already in 1974, the European Court of Justice issued the fundamental statement that 
“the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic 
activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty”.
1 Concurrently, it held that the rule of 
non-discrimination “does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national 
                                                 
1 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/74, [1974] ECR 1405, para 4. 
1 teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing 
to do with economic activity”,
2 suggesting that sport has some peculiarities and that purely 
sporting rules could be subject to a ‘sporting exception’. Likewise, the Court emphasized that 
“this restriction on the scope of the provisions in question must however remain limited to its 
proper objective”.
3 While these principles were confirmed in later ‘free movement cases’, the 
precise scope and the concrete effect of the ‘sporting exception’ together with the question of 
whether these principles also applied in connection with competition law, remained unsolved.  
 
For a long time, the Community judges refrained from ruling on the application of EC 
competition law to sport. In Bosman the Court of Justice did not consider it necessary to 
pronounce on the interpretation of the competition law provisions after it had found that the 
nationality clauses and transfer rules under consideration were contrary to the free movement 
rules.
4 Both in Deliège and Lehtonen the Court declined to rule on the matter because it had 
not been provided with sufficient information on the factual and legal background of the 
dispute.
5 Given the particular competitive dynamic in the world of sport, the Court’s 
reluctance to tackle this issue was perhaps understandable,
6 but regrettable. However, the 
silence of the Community Courts suited the sporting world who was not keen on getting a 
‘Bosman II’ judgment from Luxembourg. This was plainly illustrated by the Balog case.
7  
This Hungarian professional football player had been playing between 1993 and 1997 for a 
Belgian first division team. After the expiry of his contract, he refused the new contract that 
his club offered him because the club had stated in the local press that Balog didn’t fit in the 
future plans of the club. Balog was put on the transfer list. Initially, no club was prepared to 
pay the transfer sum and when a Norwegian club wanted to engage Balog, the transfer could 
not be completed because the Belgian federation did not deliver the international transfer 
certificate requested. After having played for half a year on a loan basis in the Israeli first 
division, Balog challenged the transfer rules before a Belgian Court (in 1998). Because of his 
Hungarian nationality (non-EU at that time) he could not rely on the Bosman ruling.
8 
                                                 
2 Walrave and Koch, para 8. 
3 Walrave and Koch, para 9. 
4 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association v Bosman, C-415/93, [1995] ECR I-4921, para 138. 
5 Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées eo., C-51/96 and C-191/97, [2000] ECR I-2549, 
paras 36-38;  Lehtonen en Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Fédération royale belge des sociétés de 
basketball, C-176/96, [2000] ECR I-2681, paras 28-30. 
6 BELL A. and TURNER-KERR P., “The place of Sport Within the Rules of Community Law: Clarification 
from the ECJ? The Deliège and Lehtonen Cases”, [2002] E.C.L.R., p 256. 
7 Balog v Royal Charleroi Sporting Club ASBL, C-264/98, removed from the register on 2/4/01. 
8 VAN DEN BOGAERT S., Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU Post Bosman, Den 
Haag, Kluwer Law International, 2005, p 105. 
2 Consequently, he challenged the transfer rules (the abolition of transfer payments for out-of-
contract third country national players within the EU/EEA was to enter into force only as 
from 1 April 1999) on the basis of EC competition law.
9 As the Belgian Court referred the 
case to the European Court of Justice, the Balog case was deemed to become the Court’s first 
ruling on the application of EC competition law to sport. However, the sporting world 
‘managed to escape the verdict’ once more as on the day Advocate General Stickx-Hackl was 
expected to deliver her opinion on the case, the football world and Balog came to a settlement 
and agreed to drop the case. Consequently, for a long time, the only guidelines as regards the 
application of EC competition rules to sport resulted from the European Commission’s 
handling of sport related competition cases and the opinion of some Advocates General,
10 
including Stix-Hackle’s as she published her point of view in the aftermath of the Balog 
case.
11 They all affirmed that EC competition provisions could apply to sport. Already in 
1999, the Commission considered that from the perspective of EC competition law, 
practices/rules of sporting federations could be grouped into three categories: 1) practices 
which, in principle, do not come under competition rules, because they are inherent to sport 
and/or necessary for its organisation; 2) practices that are, in principle, prohibited by 
competition rules; 3) practices which are restrictive of competition but likely to be exempted 
from the competition rules.
12 This framework was a useful starting point but in practice the 
borderlines between the different categories proved to be far from straightforward.
13 
Confirmation and fine tuning by the Community Courts was needed. The case of Piau and 
Meca-Medina & Majcen presented an excellent opportunity in this regard. 
 
Apart from the competition aspect, the rulings in Piau and Meca-Medina & Majcen were 
impatiently awaited because they provided the Court with another possibility to clarify the 
‘special characteristics’ of sport. While recognised in various EU fora, this concept has not 
been used in a uniform way. A distinction can be drawn within these EU approaches between 
a political/theoretical/sociological approach and a more pragmatic approach.
14 The former 
                                                 
9 Balog, Rapport d’audience, para 8. 
10  
11 EGGER A. and STIX-HACKL C., “Sports and Competition Law: A Never-ending Story?”, [2002] E.C.L.R., p 
81-91. 
12 “Commission debates application of its competition rules to sport”, IP/99/133; Report from the European 
Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the 
social function of sport within the Community framework (‘The Helsinki Report on Sport’), COM (1999) 644. 
13 WEATHERILL S., “”Fair Play Please!”: Recent developments in the application of EC law to sport”, [2003] 
CML Rev., p 82. 
14 MIEGE C., “Le sport dans l’Union européenne: entre spécificité et exception?”, [2006] Etudes Européennes,  
p 2. 
3 relates to the multifunctional role of sport (health enhancing, educational,…) and was 
followed in a number of policy documents (e.g. Nice Declaration).
15 The latter is followed by 
the Community Courts and – in the second place – by the European Commission when 
dealing with the application of EC law to sport, according to which the specific characteristics 
of sport sensu stricto are taken into account. Examples relate to the equality between 
participants and the uncertainty of the results.
16 This is closely linked with the 
interdependence of competing adversaries, or the fact that there is a difference “[…] between 
the way competition works in sport and in economic sectors”.
17 In addition, the primary role 
of the sports federations in the organisation of sporting competitions was explicitly 
acknowledged.
18  
 
In addition, the Piau and Meca-Medina & Majcen cases provided the possibility to take away 
some doubts regarding the correct application of the ‘sporting exception’. The reason for this 
uncertainty was twofold. First, the Court’s reasoning in Walrave, that competitions between 
national (football) teams have “nothing to do with economic activity”, seemed hard or even 
impossible to justify. Arguably, this can only be understood as a confirmation of a general 
feeling that the competition between national teams is a matter of “national pride and 
identity”.
19 Second, it remained unclear what the concrete legal effect of the recognition of a 
“purely sporting” rule was. Whereas the Court in Walrave made clear that the rules at issue 
fell outside the scope of EC law,
20 in Bosman the purely sporting context was only mentioned 
as a possible justification to a rule which was caught by EC law.
21 The possible confusion 
arising from the divergence between Walrave and Bosman was strengthened by the Court’s 
ruling in two later cases.
22 The Walrave approach seemed to be endorsed in Deliège, where 
the selection criteria from the Belgian judo federation to participate in international 
tournaments were scrutinised. The Court held that although the selection rules at issue 
                                                 
15 Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should 
be taken in implementing common policies, annexed to the Conclusions of the Nice European Council (7,8 and 9 
December 2000), Bulletin EU, 12-2000. 
16 Bosman, para 106; Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, paras 43-45. 
17 Mario Monti, Competition and Sport the Rules of the game, SPEECH/01/84. 
18 Transfer windows in Lehtonen; selection criteria in Deliège; doping rules in Meca-Medina & Majcen. See 
below.  
19 WEATHERILL S., “Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Sport”, in BARAV A. and WYATT D.A. 
(Eds.), Yearbook of European Law 1989, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p 60. 
20 Walrave, paras 8-9. 
21 Bosman, para 76. 
22 IBÁÑEZ COLOMO P., “The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: the Approach of the European Court of 
First Instance in the Meca-Medina and Piau cases”, [2006] ESLJ, volume 3, 2, available at 
http://www.warwick.ac.uk. 
4 “inevitably have the effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, such a 
limitation is inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event, which 
necessarily involves certain selection rules or criteria being adopted. Such rules may not 
therefore be regarded in themselves as constituting a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services prohibited by Article 59 of the Treaty”.
23 Conversely, in Lehtonen, the Court found 
that the transfer deadlines set by the Belgian basketball federation constituted an obstacle to 
the free movement of professional basketball players that could be justified by the objective 
of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions.
24 Even if one could explain the 
(seemingly?) mystified case-law by the fact that the Court showed more clemency towards 
international competitions between national teams and non-discriminatory rules,
  25 further 
guidance from the Court on the concrete application of the ‘sporting exception’ was still 
needed.        
 
 
Meca-Medina & Majcen: Wouters confirmed, ‘sporting exception’ curtailed  
  
Meca-Medina & Majcen are two professional long distance swimmers who had tested 
positive for nandralone. The international swimming federation suspended both athletes for a 
period of four years. The suspension was reduced to two years by the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (the CAS) after certain scientific experiments had showed that nandrolone’s metabolites 
can be produced endogenously by the human body at a level which can exceed the accepted 
limit. Meca-Medina & Majcen filed a complaint with the European Commission, challenging 
the compatibility of the IOC’s anti-doping regulation with the Community competition rules. 
The Commission concluded that the anti-doping legislation did not fall foul of the prohibition 
under Articles 81 and 82 EC and rejected the complaint.
26 Meca-Medina & Majcen brought 
an action before the Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance stipulated that “the 
principles extracted from the case-law, as regards the application to sporting regulations of the 
Community provisions in respect of the freedom of movement of persons and services, are 
equally valid as regards the Treaty provisions relating to competition”.
27 The Court of First 
Instance continued that “the fact that purely sporting legislation may have nothing to do with 
                                                 
23 Deliège, para 64. 
24 Lehtonen, paras 47-60. In reality, the Court questioned the stricter deadlines for players from the European 
zone compared to players from others zones.   
25 IBÁÑEZ COLOMO. 
26 Meca-Medina et Majcen v CIO, COMP/38.158. 
27 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, T-313/02, publicatie para 42. 
5 economic activity, with the result, according to the Court, that it does not fall within the scope 
of Articles 39 and 49 EC, means also that it has nothing to do with the economic relationships 
of competition, with the result that it also does not fall within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 
EC”.
28 Contrary to the Commission, the Court of First Instance did not examine whether the 
sport at issue could be qualified as an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC. 
Nor did it examine whether the IOC (or the international swimming federation) had to be 
considered as undertakings or associations of undertakings. The Court of First Instance 
directly assessed the “purely sporting” nature of the anti-doping regulation. It acknowledged 
that high-level sport has become, to a great extent, an economic activity, but pointed out that 
the fight against doping does not pursue an economic objective. As the campaign against 
doping intends to safeguard the health of athletes and to preserve the spirit of fair play, “it 
forms part of the cardinal rule of sport”.
29 The Court of First Instance emphasised that “sport 
is essentially a gratuitous and not an economic act, even when the athlete performs it in the 
course of professional sport”.
30 Therefore, it concluded that the prohibition of doping and the 
anti-doping legislation concern exclusively “a non-economic aspect of that sporting action, 
which constitutes its very essence”.
31 Consequently, the rules to combat doping “are 
intimately linked to sport” […] and do not come within the scope of Articles 49, 81 and 82 
EC.
32 The Court of First Instance rejected the two arguments brought forward by Meca-
Medina & Majcen on the economic nature of the contested anti-doping regulation. In its 
opinion, the eventual economic repercussions for the athletes and the fact that the IOC might 
possibly have had in mind the economic potential of the Olympic Games when adopting the 
anti-doping legislation, “is not sufficient to alter the purely sporting nature of that 
legislation”.
33 On these grounds, the Court of First Instance dismissed the action.  
 
Whereas the final outcome of this case could be defended, the reasoning of the Court of First 
Instance seems less convincing. Admittely, the exclusively sporting nature of drug control 
rules was recognised in English case law.
34 Conversely, the Swiss Federal Court has stated 
                                                 
28 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, T-313/02, para 44. 
29 Idem. 
30 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, T-313/02, para 45. 
31 Idem. 
32 Remarkably, the Court of First Instance emphasised that if the anti-doping legislation would be discriminatory 
in nature, it would not escape the Treaty provisions. Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, T-313/02, paras 47-
49. 
33 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, T-313/02, paras 51-57. 
34 Edwards v the British Athletic Federation and the International Amateur Athletic Federation, English High 
Court [1998] Common Market Law Reports 2, p 363-371; See also BLACKSHAW I., “Doping Is a Sporting, 
Not an Economic Matter”, [2005] ISLJ, 3-4, p 51-52. 
6 that the suspension from international competitions exceeds a simple rule/sanction assuring 
the smooth progress of sporting competitions.
35 What is at stake, is the problematic attempt to 
make a clear distinction between purely sporting and economic rules.
36 Whereas anti-doping 
rules are not primarily aimed at profit making, they clearly have economic repercussions. 
Therefore, they can be regarded as both ‘sporting’ and ‘economic’ in nature.
37 Moreover, by 
qualifying anti-doping rules as rules of a purely sporting interest which therefore fall outside 
the scope of Community law, it appears that the Court of First Instance indeed granted too 
much room for manoeuvre to the sporting federations.
38  
 
On appeal, the Court of Justice set aside the Court of First Instance’s judgment.
39 The Court 
of Justice largely relied on its longstanding case law on sport but added two new elements of 
great consequence.
40 It started by recalling that sport is subject to Community law in so far as 
it constitutes an economic activity. Again referring to Walrave, the Court continued that the 
prohibitions enacted by the Treaty provisions do not affect rules concerning questions which 
are of purely sporting interest.
41 With regard to the difficulty of severing the economic 
aspects from the sporting aspects of a sport, the Court confirmed, referring to Donà, Bosman 
and Deliège, that the provisions on free movement of persons and the freedom to provide 
services do not preclude rules or practices justified on non-economic grounds which relate to 
the particular nature and context of certain sporting events. However, such a restriction on the 
scope of the provisions in question must remain limited to its proper objective.
42 So far this 
only confirms the established case law on sport. In paragraph 27, the Court of Justice 
introduces a first new element. Contrary to the Court of First Instance, the Court does not try 
to make an artificial distinction between the economic and sporting aspects of the sporting 
activity at stake. The Court draws a distinction between the activities of sportsmen and the 
rules governing these activities. According to the Court, “[…] it is apparent that the mere fact 
that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of 
                                                 
35  Ligue Suisse de Hockey sur Glace contre Dubé [1994] BGE 120 II 369 available at 
http://www.bger.ch/fr/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht/jurisdiction-recht-
leitentscheide1954.htm; G. contre Fédération Equestre Internationale et tribunal arbitral du Sport [1993] BGE 
119 II 271 available at http://www.bger.ch/fr/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-
recht/jurisdiction-recht-leitentscheide1954.htm. 
36 WEATHERILL S., “Anti-Doping Rules and EC Law”, [2005] E.C.L.R., p 416-421. 
37 Ibid., p 420. 
38 VAN DEN BOGAERT S. and VERMEERSCH A., “Sport and the European Treaty: A Tale of Uneasy 
Bedfellows?”, [2006] E.L.Rev., p 834. 
39 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, nyr. 
40 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 22. 
41 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 25. 
42 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 26. 
7 the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid 
it down”.
43 In other words, a sporting case can involve both economic and non-economic 
aspects and the non-economic elements do not (always) suffice to remove the case from the 
scope of Community law. Moreover, “If the sporting activity in question falls within the 
scope of the Treaty, the conditions for engaging in it are then subject to all the obligations 
which result from the various provisions of the Treaty. It follows that the rules which govern 
that activity must satisfy the requirements of those provisions, which, in particular, seek to 
ensure freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide 
services, or competition”.
44 Thereupon, the Court of Justice ruled that the Court of First 
Instance made an error of law by holding that rules could automatically be excluded from the 
scope of EC competition law (Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty) on the sole ground that they 
were regarded as purely sporting with regard to the application of the free movement 
provisions, without any need to determine first whether the rules fulfilled the specific 
requirements of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
45 When an activity must be assessed under EC 
competition law, it will be necessary to determine whether the rules which govern that activity 
emanate from an undertaking, whether the latter restricts competition or abuses its dominant 
position, and whether that restriction or that abuse affects trade between Member States.
46 It 
is unclear whether the Court’s statement should be interpreted as a general rejection of the 
trend towards convergence – to a certain extent – that some authors see between the 
provisions on free movement and the competitions rules.
47 The Court does not elaborate on 
this, but it seems apparent that the Court of Justice firmly criticized the half-hearted analysis 
of the Court of First Instance, rather than turning down the convergence theory.
48 The latter 
would need further confirmation by the Court of Justice. As Weatherill convincingly 
advocates, with regard to the application of EC principles to sport, it seems appropriate to plea 
for a “convergence in outcome”.
49 What is or is not acceptable under free movement 
                                                 
43 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 27. 
44 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 28. 
45 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, paras 29-34. 
46 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 30. 
47 MORTELMANS K.J.M., “Towards convergence in the application of the rules on free movement and on 
competition” [2001] C.M.L.Rev., p 613-649; NAZZINI R., “Article 81 EC between time present and time past : a 
normative critique of « restriction of competition » in EU law”, [2006] C.M.L.Rev., p 497-536; O’LOUGHLIN 
R., “EC Competition Rules and Free Movement Rules: An Examination of the Parallels and their Furtherance by 
the ECJ Wouters Decision”, [2003] E.C.L.R., p 62-69. 
48 WEATHERILL S., “Anti-doping revisited – the demise of the rule of “purely sporting interest””?, [2006] 
E.C.L.Rev., p 649. 
49 Idem. 
8 provisions, should also be acceptable or not under EC competition law, and vice versa. This is 
not to say that the legal reasoning under both strands of Community law should be identical. 
 
When judging on the concrete questions at issue in Meca Medina & Majcen, the Court of 
Justice added a second new element to its previous sport related case-law. The Court relied on 
the Wouters judgment to examine the contested anti-doping rules.
50 According to the Court, 
“the compatibility of rules with the Community rules on competition cannot be assessed in the 
abstract”.
51 Therefore, the Court investigated whether the anti-doping rules are intimately 
linked to the proper conduct of sporting competition, whether they are necessary to combat 
doping effectively and whether the limitation of athletes’ freedom of action does not go 
beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.
52 The Court stated that the European 
Commission rightly took the view that the contested rules served the objective of 
guaranteeing fair competitive sport. By this means, the Court recognised the significance of 
safeguarding equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of 
competitive sport and the ethical values in sport.
53 Moreover, “given that penalties are 
necessary to ensure enforcement of the doping ban, their effect on athletes’ freedom of action 
must be considered to be, in principle, inherent itself in the anti-doping rules”.
54 The Court 
did not explicitly state that the anti-doping rules at issue were to be regarded as a decision of 
an association of undertakings that limits the freedom of movement, but asserted directly that 
they were justified by a legitimate objective. However, this does not automatically put the 
contested anti-doping rules outside the prohibitions in Article 81 EC. The Court 
acknowledges that the penal nature of the anti-doping rules and the magnitude of the penalties 
applicable “are capable of producing adverse effects on competition”.
55 If penalties were 
ultimately to prove unjustified they could result in an athlete’s unwarranted exclusion from 
sporting events and accordingly in lopsided conditions. Therefore, the Court of Justice ruled 
that “in order not to be covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC, the 
restrictions thus imposed by those rules must be limited to what is necessary to ensure the 
proper conduct of competitive sport”.
56 According to the Court, the contested doping rules 
                                                 
50 Wouters e.o. v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, C-309/99, [2002] ECR I-1577. 
51 Goettrup-Klim e.o. Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AMBA, C-250/92, [1994] ECR 
I-5641, para 31. Hereinafter, DLG. 
52 Wouters e.o. v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, C-309/99, para 97; Meca-Medina & 
Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 42.  
53 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 43. 
54 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 44. 
55 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, para 47. 
56 Idem. The Court referred to paragraph 35 of the case DLG. 
9 could be excessive in two ways: first with regard to the conditions underlying the dividing 
line between circumstances that amount to doping, in respect of which penalties may be 
imposed and those which do not, and second with regard to the severity of those penalties. 
The Court refrained from making a detailed analysis. Concerning the former, the Court 
referred to the scientific knowledge as it stood at the time the anti-doping rules were adopted 
and applied to Meca-Medina and Majcen. On this basis and because the appellants did not 
specify at what level the threshold in question should have been set, the Court found that the 
restrictions that follow from this threshold for professional sportsmen were not excessive.
57 
On the severity of the penalties, the Court’s assessment remained shallow: as the appellants 
did not bring this element up, the Court stated that “it has not been established that the anti-
doping rules at issue are disproportionate”.
58  
 
The Court’s reticence towards a more elaborated assessment can be deplored,
59 but is 
comprehensible. It seems logical that it is not the task of judges to enter into the details of the 
specific and technical anti-doping regulation. Along these lines, the confirmation of Wouters 
in Meca-Medina & Majcen can be seen as an “important and welcome development in the 
light of the tendency towards greater self-regulation in the EU”.
60  However, the Court’s 
ruling illustrates that a marginal assessment can be carried out by the Community judges. 
Moreover, by simply raising the issue of the severity of the penalties, the Court leaves future 
doping offenders the possibility of challenging the doping penalties on the basis of EC law. 
The sporting federations are warned: the proportionality principle must be taken into account 
when setting doping penalties and it is not excluded that the Court of Justice will assess the 
issue in greater detail when it would be raised in future litigation. concrete WADA 
hervorming  
       
Wouters approach not new in sporting context 
 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Court of Justice dismissed the action brought by 
the appellants and confirmed the Commission’s rejection of their complaint. Even if the 
outcome of both rulings was identical, the analysis of the Court of Justice is to be preferred to 
                                                 
57 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, paras 49-54. 
58 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, paras 49-55. 
59 SLUIJS J.J.M. and VAN WOERKOM M.C.A., “Meca-Medina en Majcen (hogere voorziening): Convergentie 
gepreciseerd, Wouters bevestigd”, [2006] NTER, p 253. 
60 SZYSZCZAK E., “Competition and sport”, [2007] E.L.Rev., p 106. 
10 the approach of the Court of First Instance. Arguably, by applying the Wouters approach, the 
Court of Justice found an appropriate way of tackling the difficulty of severing the economic 
from the sporting aspects of a sporting case. This approach has the double advantage of not a 
priori excluding sport related cases from the application of EC law and, at the same time, 
taking into account the peculiarities of sport. Even if the precise scope and implications of the 
Wouters judgment remain unclear,
61 and even if the judgment was heavily criticised,
62 it 
seems to provide a plausible basis for reconciling EC competition law with sport.  
 
This can inter alia be deduced from the fact that in the past a Wouters like approach was 
followed on several occasions. In sporting cases that predate the Wouters judgment (19 
February 2002), reference was made to the DLG case which is considered to be the 
predecessor of the Wouters judgment.
63 The case concerned the statutes of a co-operative 
purchasing association in the agricultural sector. The Court of Justice stated that a provision in 
these statutes forbidding the association’s members to participate in other forms of organized 
cooperation that are in direct competition with it, was not caught by the prohibition in Article 
81(1) EC, “so long as the abovementioned provision is restricted to what is necessary to 
ensure that the co-operative functions properly and maintains its contractual power in relation 
to producers”.
64 The DLG case, which forms an example of the ancillary restraints doctrine,
65 
was referred to by several advocates general when dealing with sporting cases. In Bosman, 
Advocate General Lenz mentioned DLG as it was brought up by UEFA.
66 The Advocate 
General emphasised that the case showed that only those restrictions of competition which are 
indispensable for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by them do not fall within the 
prohibition of Article 81. Finding the nationality clauses and transfer rules at issue not 
necessary or indispensable for the proper functioning of the football sector, he held that the 
possible beneficial effects of those provisions could therefore be examined only in the context 
of Article 81(3). This view was confirmed by Advocate General Stix-Hackl in her ‘informal’ 
opinion in the Balog case.
67 The Advocates General in Deliège and Lehtonen both relied on 
                                                 
61  
62  
63 DLG, C-250/92, supra; SZYSZCZAK E., p 106. 
64 DLG, C-250/92, para 45. 
65 JONES A. and SUFRIN B., EC Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 216-220. 
66 Conclusion Advocate General Lenz in Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association t. Bosman, C-
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11 DLG.
68 Admittedly, their analysis on the applicability of the competition rules was only 
considered in the alternative as the national judges had not provided all details to make an 
elaborate analysis. In Lehtonen Advocate General Alber held that the transfer periods at stake 
probably entailed a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC because 
they prevent clubs “from increasing the attractiveness of their product by taking on new 
players during a certain period”.
69 Simultaneously, these transfer windows guarantee 
comparability of results of matches within a season. As that objective is decisive for the 
competition between clubs which consists in increasing the attractiveness of their matches, 
Alber concluded that the transfer periods were therefore compatible with Article 81 EC, 
however, only to the extent that they may be reconciled with the freedom of movement for 
workers.
70 In Deliège, Advocate General Cosmans held that even if the contested selection 
criteria “were to be regarded as reducing competition, in the sense that they prevent certain 
judokas from taking part in certain international tournaments, the contested rules do not fall 
within the scope of [Article 81 EC] because they are indispensable for attaining the legitimate 
objectives deriving from the particular nature of judo”.
71 In the pre-Wouters period, also the 
European Commission relied on the DLG approach in sport related cases, however, without 
explicitly mentioning the case. This was illustrated by its statement in the Helsinki report that 
some sporting practices do not come under competition rules because they are inherent to 
sport and/or necessary for its organisation.
72 A concrete application can be found in the 
Mouscroun case.
73 The case concerned a complaint from the Communauté Urbaine de Lille 
who challenged UEFA’s decision not to allow the UEFA Cup game between the Belgian club 
Mouscroun (a town near the French border) and Metz to be played in Lille (France). In 
practice, this meant that Lille was unable to hire out its stadium to Mouscroun. The decision 
was based on an UEFA rule which stipulated that, apart from very exceptional circumstances, 
every club must play its home match at its own ground. The Commission rejected the 
complaint because it considered that UEFA’s “at home and away from home” rule is needed 
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69 Conclusion Advocate General Alber in Lehtonen, para 105. 
70 Idem, para 108. 
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72 Supra 
73 “Limits to application of Treaty competition rules to sport: Commission gives clear signal”, IP/99/965. 
12 “to ensure equality between clubs”, thereby recognising the legitimate right of self regulation 
of a sporting organisation.
74  
 
After the Wouters judgment, the Commission settled two sporting cases with explicit 
reference to Wouters. In the case of ENIC, UEFA’s multi-ownership rule, according to which 
a company or individual cannot directly or indirectly control more than one of the clubs 
participating in a UEFA club competition, was under scrutiny.
75 ENIC, a company that owned 
stakes in six European clubs in five different countries, considered that the rule distorted 
competition by preventing and restricting investment in European clubs, and lodged a 
complaint with the European Commission. According to the Commission, the question to 
answer was whether “the consequential effects of the rule are inherent in the pursuit of the 
very existence of credible pan European football competitions”.
76 In a preliminary conclusion 
the Commission stated that the rule could be qualified as a decision of an association of 
undertakings or an agreement between associations of undertakings inside UEFA but that the 
restrictions imposed by the rule may escape the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. 
Before coming to a final verdict, the Commission invited third parties to send observations as 
to whether the restrictions were limited to what is necessary “to preserve the integrity of the 
UEFA club competitions and to ensure the uncertainty as to results”.
77 The Commission 
referred to the recognition of legitimate objectives in the view of the considerable social 
importance of football in the Community by the Court of Justice in Bosman and the opinion 
of Advocate General Alber in Lehtonen. In addition, the Commission mentioned the decision 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in the case of AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA 
where the contested rule was approved because it preserves or even enhances economic and 
sporting competition.
78 In its final decision, the Commission held that a rule may fall outside 
the scope of competition rules despite possible negative business effects, provided that it does 
not go beyond what is necessary to ensure its legitimate aim – in casu the protection of the 
uncertainty of the results – and consequently rejected the complaint.
79 In Meca-Medina & 
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13 Majcen the Commission quoted Wouters for a second time.
80 The Commission came to the 
conclusion that the anti-doping rules at issue are intimately linked to the proper conduct of 
sporting competition, that they are necessary to combat doping effectively and that the 
limitation of an athlete’s freedom of action does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that 
objective. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that these rules did not contravene the 
prohibition under Article 81 EC.
81 When the case came on appeal before the Court of First 
Instance, the Commission played down the influence of Wouters in reaching its decision. The 
Commission stated at the hearing, in reply to a question from the Court, that the disputed 
decision was based on Walrave, Donà and Deliège and therefore, on the purely sporting 
nature of the anti-doping rules at issue. The Wouters based analysis under competition law 
served only “in the alternative” or “for the sake of completeness”.
82 The explicit confirmation 
of the Wouters approach by the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina & Majcen validates the 
direction that was followed by the European Commission and several advocates general in 
previous sporting cases. Moreover, it confirms several authors’ plea to use Wouters in a 
sporting context.
83
 
 
Sport and EC competition law after Meca-Medina & Majcen 
 
As the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina & Majcen unequivocally indicated that sporting rules 
do not a priori escape the application of EC competition law the first step in analysing 
whether a given sporting rule conflicts with EC competition law, will be to examine whether 
the sporting rule at stake meets the conditions of Articles 81(1) and 82 EC. In this respect, 
three major aspects must be taken into account. As many elements of this analysis were 
recently under consideration in the Piau case, the facts of this case are first being illuminated.  
 
The case of Piau, the second sporting case where the Community judges scrutinised a 
provision in the statues of a sporting federation under EC competition law, concerned the 
validity of the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations.
84 Piau, who wanted to become a players’ 
agent himself, had lodged a complaint with the European Commission. He considered that the 
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14 regulations were contrary to EC competition law because of the restrictions on the access to 
the profession. Following the opening of a competition procedure by the Commission, FIFA 
agreed to alter its regulations. The new regulations maintained the obligation to hold a licence 
issued by the competent national (football) association for an unlimited period, but entailed 
some changes in order to make the licensing procedure more objective and transparent. The 
oral interview was replaced by an examination in the form of a multiple choice test and the 
obligatory bank deposit was replaced by the choice between taking a liability insurance and a 
bank deposit. Moreover, the regulations stipulated that the relations between the agent and the 
player must be the subject of a written (renewable) contract for a maximum period of two 
years, specifying the agent’s remuneration (to be calculated on the basis of the player’s basic 
gross salary) and established a system of sanctions for clubs, players and agents. On this 
basis, the Commission decided to take no further action and rejected Piau’s complaint for a 
lack of Community interest.
85 Piau challenged this decision before the Court of First Instance.           
 
Undertakings and associations of undertakings 
 
As Article 81(1) EC applies to “undertakings” and “associations of undertakings” and Article 
82 EC applies to “undertakings”, these concepts entail a first key element to consider. The 
term “undertaking” was given a broad interpretation in the ECJ’s case-law. It “encompasses 
every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and 
the way in which it is financed”.
86 An economic activity is any activity that involves “offering 
goods or services on the market”.
87 It is irrelevant that the body is not profit-making or that it 
is not set up for an economic purpose.
88 As a consequence of this functional approach, 
sporting bodies can also be considered as undertakings.
89 Already in 1992, in the case on the 
distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup, the Commission held that FIFA, the 
Italian football federation and the local organising committee carried on activities of an 
economic nature and consequently, constituted undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 
EC.
90 This was confirmed in several sporting cases. Regarding (football) clubs, the 
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Commission came to the conclusion that the parties had infringed Article 81(1) EC for restrictive sales terms for 
tour packages and thus making it impossible for other tour operators and travel agencies to find other sources of 
15 Commission confirmed this – inter alia – in ENIC, because, through their team, the clubs 
supply “sporting entertainment by playing matches against other clubs, usually in the context 
of a championship. These events are made available against payment (admission fees and/or 
radio and television broadcasting rights, sponsorship, advertising, merchandising, etc.) on 
several markets”.
91 The Court of First Instance confirmed this viewpoint in the Piau case.
92 
National sporting associations can be both undertakings and associations of undertakings. 
When these associations carry out economic activities themselves, for instance by selling 
broadcasting rights or by the commercial exploitation of a sport event, they are to be 
considered as undertakings.
93 In Piau, the Court of First Instance considered that the national 
football associations – “groupings of football clubs for which the practice of football is an 
economic activity” – constitute associations of undertakings.
94 The fact that these associations 
group both amateur and professional clubs does not alter this qualification.
95 In addition, 
international sporting associations can be both undertakings and associations of 
undertakings.
96 At the same time, an international association can be an association of 
associations of undertakings.
97   
 
The question of whether an individual athlete can be considered as an undertaking had not 
thus far been addressed by the Commission or the Community judges. Whereas Advocate 
General Lenz found in his conclusion on the Bosman case that football players had to be 
considered as employees and did not constitute undertakings, this does not exclude that 
individual sportsmen might be considered to be undertakings for the purpose of articles 81 
and 82 EC.
98 Reference can be made to the Deliège case where the Court of Justice held that a 
high level athlete (judoka) participating in an international competition exercised an economic 
activity, although she was not remunerated by the organiser.
99 Therefore, (independent) 
individual athletes may constitute undertakings within the meaning of EC competition law. 
                                                                                                                                                         
supply. However, since it was the first time that the Commission had taken action on the distribution of tickets 
for a sporting event, and because the case involved complicating factors in view of safety aspects and because 
the infringement came to an end with the completion of the 1990 World Cup, the Commission decided not to 
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16 Moreover, even if employees are generally considered as acting on behalf of the entity that 
employs them as a result of which they can not constitute autonomous undertakings,
100 the 
status of employee does not exclude that a person can be considered as an undertaking. 
Insofar as the employee pursues his own economic interests independent of the employer, he 
may be considered an undertaking in the sense of Article 81 EC.
101 In the case of sportsmen, 
one may think of a professional football player as one who enters into a sponsoring agreement 
with a major sponsor.
102
  
Restriction of competition or abuse of a dominant position 
 
A second key question to address when analysing the applicability of EC competition law, is 
whether the sporting rule at stake restricts competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC 
or constitutes an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC. Therefore, it must first be 
analysed whether the rule in question, which normally arises from the statutes of a sporting 
federation, can be considered as an “agreement”, “decision”, or “concerted practice”. 
Although FIFA claimed in the Balog case that its regulations could not be considered as an 
agreement between undertakings or a decision of an association of undertakings,
103 rules set 
down by sporting federations are usually considered to be decisions by an association of 
undertakings. In Bosman, Advocate General Lenz held that the nationality clauses and the 
transfer rules concerned decisions of associations of undertakings,
104 whereas the Court of 
First Instance came to the same conclusion with regard to the players’ agents’ regulations.
105 
In Meca Medina & Majcen, the Court of Justice held – admittedly only implicitly – that the 
IOC anti-doping regulations as implemented by the international swimming federation, could 
be considered a decision of an association of undertakings.
106  
 
Thereafter, it must be analysed whether the rule at stake has as its object or effect to restrict or 
distort competition within the common market. In his opinion in Bosman, Advocate General 
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17 Lenz confirmed the Commission’s point of view.
107 According to the Commission and Lenz, 
the nationality clauses restricted the possibilities for clubs to compete with each other by 
engaging players. That is a restriction of competition between those clubs. In fact, this can be 
seen as a way of sharing “sources of supply” within the meaning of Article 81(1)(c) EC. The 
transfer rules and the payment of a transfer sum were considered as rules replacing “the 
normal system of supply and demand by a uniform machinery which leads to the existing 
competition situation being preserved and the clubs being deprived of the possibility of 
making use of the chances, with respect to the engagement of players, which would be 
available to them under normal competitive conditions”. Lenz came to the conclusion that the 
restriction of competition was not only the effect of the rules in question, but was also 
intended by the clubs and associations.
108 However, this concept remains rather scantily 
elaborated in the case-law. In Meca-Medina & Majcen, the Court of Justice only briefly 
touched upon this aspect by stating that the anti-doping rules were capable of producing 
adverse effects on competition because an athlete’s unwarranted exclusion from sporting 
events would lead to “impairment of the conditions under which the activity at issue is 
engaged in”.
109 The analysis of this aspect by the Court of First Instance in Piau can be 
criticised because it did not clearly indicate an anticompetitive object or effect to justify the 
application of Article 81(1) EC.
110 Instead, the Court of First Instance only held that the 
compulsory licence constitutes a barrier to the access to the economic activity of players’ 
agents, and therefore “necessarily affects competition”.
111 The test carried out by the Court of 
First Instance closely relates to the concept of “market access” which is normally used in a 
free movement context.
112
 
An aspect barely taken into account in sport related competition cases is the fact that the 
prohibition of Article 81(1) EC covers only appreciable interferences with competition.
113 A 
possible explanation might be that sporting associations often hold a (quasi) monopoly 
position in their sport. Closely related to this is the concept “relevant market”. Especially in 
the context of Article 82 EC, but also within the context of Article 81(1) EC, it is important to 
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18 determine the relevant market, which entails a geographical and a product market.
114 The 
geographical market covers the territory of the associations/clubs where a given sporting rule 
applies.  In her de facto opinion in Balog, Advocate General Stix-Hackl emphasised that the 
fact that sport has certain particular features which distinguish it from other economic sectors 
does not mean that there cannot be a market, or even several markets.
115 Subsequently, when 
scrutinising the transfer rules, she indicated that there were three – interconnected – 
markets.
116 The first is the exploitation market where both clubs and associations act as 
undertakings and exploit their performances, e.g. by selling broadcasting rights. The second 
market is the contest market, “in which the typical product of professional sport is produced: 
the sporting contest”.
117 The third market is the supply market where the clubs “sell” and 
“buy” players.
118 Although this analysis focused on the transfer rules in football, it seems that 
it can for the most part be transposed to other major (team) sports. Both in Meca Medina & 
Majcen and in Piau, the concept of relevant market received little attention. In Meca Medina 
& Majcen, one could suggest that the contest market was at stake, although this was not 
explicitly stated by the Community judges. In Piau, the Court of First Instance mentioned that 
the rules in question affected the “market for the provision of services where the buyers are 
players and clubs and the sellers are agents”.
119
 
Concerning the analysis of whether a sporting organisation holds a dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 82 EC, it has already been stated that sporting associations often have 
a monopoly in their sport and can be considered dominant in the market of the organisation of 
sporting activities for their particular sport. In its judgment on the applicability of Article 82 
EC in Piau, the Court of First Instance found, contrary to the European Commission which 
had held that Article 82 EC was not applicable as FIFA was not active on the market for the 
provision of advise of players, that FIFA – although not itself an economic operator that buys 
players’ agents’ services – held a collective dominant position on the market at issue as the 
emanation of the national associations and the clubs.
120 According to the Court of First 
Instance, FIFA’s players’ agents regulations result in the clubs “being so linked as to their 
conduct on a particular market that they present themselves on that market as a collective 
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19 entity  vis-à-vis their competitors, their trading partners and consumers”.
121 This decision 
correlates with the finding of Advocate General Lenz in Bosman that the clubs in a 
professional league are “united by such economic links” that together they are to be regarded 
as having a dominant position”, although he did not consider UEFA’s or FIFA’s position.
122       
 
Effect on trade between Member States 
 
A last element that needs to be considered when analysing the applicability of Articles 81(1) 
and 82 EC concerns the effect of the rule in question on trade between Member States. Again, 
this aspect received little attention in sport related cases. However, the broad definition of this 
concept – a direct or indirect, actual or potential, influence on the pattern of trade between 
Member States suffices –
123 seems to pose little problems in the case of sport. Rules 
originating from European or international sporting federations are applicable in several 
countries and are likely to affect trade between Member States. Besides, given the 
international context of professional sport, rules originating from national sporting federations 
might also affect trade between Member States. Moreover, the reasoning that a sporting rule, 
e.g. on the transfer of players, would have nothing to do with trade,
124 can be overruled by the 
fact that also the concept of trade has been interpreted broadly.
125  
 
Wouters approach or Article 81(3) EC? 
 
After  Meca-Medina & Majcen, it seems clear that when a given sporting rule meets the 
conditions of Article 81(1) EC the second step in analysing whether the rule conflicts with EC 
competition law, is to apply the Wouters test. Therefore, one has to analyse whether the rule at 
stake pursues a legitimate objective and whether its anti-competitive effects are inherent in the 
pursuit of this objective and are proportionate. Because several ‘sporting’ objectives – like 
maintaining a certain equality between participants and the uncertainty of the results or the 
protection of athletes’ health –
126 have been accepted as legitimate, the main assessment will 
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20 relate to the proportionality principle. This is a factual analysis which has to be carried out by 
the European Commission and the Community judges.  
 
Once established that a certain sporting rule does not meet the criteria set out in Wouters, one 
might look for justification under Article 81(3) EC.
127 When the four cumulative conditions 
of this provision – improvement in the production or distribution of goods or the promotion of 
technical or economic progress; allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits; 
without imposing restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives; and without affording the parties the possibility of substantially eliminating 
competition – are met, the prohibition under Article 81(1) may be declared inapplicable. A 
question arising in the sporting context is whether socio-political motives can play a role in 
the analysis under Article 81(3). On the basis of the Commission Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3), it seems that the answer should be negative.
128 Following these 
guidelines, goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can only be taken into account to the 
extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 81(3).
129 In reality, 
these guidelines are to a large extent based on valid economic considerations, what might, as 
stated by Bourgeois and Bocken, “result in a too limited and reduced scope of the exception 
rule of Article 81(3) EC”.
130  
 
Apparently, the Court of First Instance disregarded these guidelines when assessing the FIFA 
players agents’ regulations in Piau. Admittedly, the Court of First Instance came to the 
conclusion that the conditions of Article 81(1) were fulfilled without making a detailed 
analysis. Subsequently, the Court did not apply the Wouters test, but directly continued by 
considering whether the conditions of Article 81(3) EC were met. Again, its analysis was 
rather vague. Referring to the fact that apart from France, there would be no national 
regulation governing the occupation of sports agents as well as to the fact that the players’ 
agents would not have a collective organisation, the Court of First Instance came to the 
conclusion that the mandatory licence system results in a qualitative selection, appropriate for 
the attainment of the double objective of raising professional and ethical standards for the 
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21 occupation of players’ agents in order to protect players.
131 It should be noted that the analysis 
of facts of the Court of First Instance lacks some nuance. In particular, the Court’s finding 
that there is barely any national regulation on players’ agents and that there is no collective 
organisation of players’ agents seems to be inaccurate.
132 On appeal, the Court of Justice 
rejected Piau’s pleas, without giving much guidance.
133     
 
Both the case of Meca-Medina & Majcen and the case of Piau illustrate that sport does not a 
priori escape EC competition law and that the existing EC legal framework is sufficiently 
flexible to take into account the specific characteristics of sport. However, the approach in 
both cases differs. One might wonder whether this difference is relevant for the sporting 
world. From the viewpoint of the sporting federations, the key issue is to avoid getting a 
‘European red card’. The underlying rationale seems of little importance. However, from a 
legal point of view, the choice between the Wouters approach and the application of Article 
81(3) EC has some bearing on the burden of proof. Under Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 the 
burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) EC rests on the authority or party alleging 
the infringement.
134 The burden of proving that the conditions of Article 81(3) EC are met, 
rests on the defender.     
 
 
Conclusion: Legal certainty and the future of sports governance in Europe 
 
The application of EC law to sport provokes repeatedly, most recently in the Parliaments’ 
report on professional football,
135 calls for more legal certainty. The Meca-Medina & Majcen 
ruling from the Court of Justice might have a double impact on the relationship between EC 
law and sport. On the one hand, by clarifying that sporting rules do not automatically fall 
outside the scope of EC law, the Meca-Medina & Majcen ruling might form an incentive for 
sportsmen and other parties to challenge the role and the action of sporting associations under 
EC law. A similar development should not be supported as such. In the concrete case of 
doping offences, for example, the Community Courts seem not to be the most appropriate 
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22 instances in which to settle these cases. This is not to say that the sporting community should 
not organise itself without taking into account the requisites of EC law. On the other hand, the 
application of the Wouters test in Meca-Medina & Majcen provides useful guidance for the 
future application of EC law to sport. 
 
Against the background of the quest for greater legal certainty, several options occur with 
regard to the future application of EC competition rules to sport.
136 So far, the relationship 
between sport and EC law has been based on a case-by-case analysis and a soft law approach, 
with the Helsinki report and the Nice Declaration as the most prominent examples. Other 
possibilities relate to a Social Dialogue,
137 a Treaty revision or a block exemption. The option 
of a Treaty revision could take several forms. Theoretically, one could provide sport with 
exemptions from competition (and free movement) law provisions by amending Articles 81 
and 82 (and 39) EC. Arguably, this seems excessive and the Constitutional Treaty did not 
follow this line.
138 A block exemption seems also unlikely. This technique is used by the 
Commission (in the form of a Regulation) in order to exempt particular practices or branches 
from the application of Article 81 EC. The question remains as to what particular sporting 
practices should be exempted. As a block exemption only relates to competition law, a very 
generous block exemption for sport might undermine the Court’s case law on free 
movement.
139 In addition, it seems that no consensus exists within the Commission on 
granting sport such an exemption status.
140  
 
On the basis of the forgoing, it seems appropriate to maintain the current combination of a 
case-by-case analysis and a soft law approach. As has already been stated, the existing EC 
legal framework is sufficiently flexible to take account of the specific characteristics of sport. 
Both for the Community judges and for the European Commission this seems to be a 
workable tool in order to maintain a balance between the EC ‘rules of the game’ and the 
specific nature of sport. Although not all details have been worked out yet, the outcome of 
future litigation seems fairly ‘predictable’. On the basis of the existing case-law, it should be 
feasible to predict whether or not a sport related rule is likely to be prohibited under EC 
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23 (competition) law. The concrete legal reasoning behind such judgments might need further 
elaboration. The Oulmers case, where the Belgian Charleroi football team – supported by the 
G-14 – challenges the players release system of FIFA,
141 will provide the Court of Justice 
with a first possibility to do so. More concretely, the Belgian judge referred the following 
preliminary question to the Court of Justice: “Do the obligations on clubs and football players 
having employment contracts with those clubs imposed by the provisions of FIFA's statutes 
and regulations providing for the obligatory release of players to national federations without 
compensation and the unilateral and binding determination of the co-ordinated international 
match calendar constitute unlawful restrictions of competition or abuses of a dominant 
position or obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms conferred by the EC Treaty 
and are they therefore contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty or to any other provision of 
Community law, particularly Articles 39 and 49 of the Treaty?”.
142 Without entering into 
detail, one might argue that this rule seems to be contrary to EC law, not so much because 
there cannot be a system of (mandatory) players release as such, but rather because the current 
system is not proportionate. It seems totally acceptable that clubs can be obliged to release 
players to participate in international competitions. It seems to be unacceptable that they have 
to do so without any compensation and bear the risk of potential injuries.
143     
 
By way of conclusion, one might say that all’s fair in sport and competition, provided it is 
proportionate, or, as Weatherill states forcefully, sporting bodies enjoy a “conditional 
autonomy” when setting the rules of the game.
144 In order to maintain the current balance, the 
dialogue between the sporting world and the Community institutions must be preserved and 
enhanced. Only on the basis of mutual understanding and respect may the sporting 
associations keep their leading role.  
------------------------------------- 
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